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INTRODUCTION
In and of itself, the aging of the American population poses no ethical or
legal issue for the American attorney. Indeed, at least for attorneys working
with wealth management, estate devolution, and the ever-changing state and
federal tax codes, the accumulation of years is often accompanied by an
accumulation of wealth and attorney employment options. Wealth creates
the indispensable milieu for a productive attorney-client relationship. But,
the accumulation of years can bring less attractive options. As Ralph Waldo
Emerson concluded in his essay Circles: "Nature abhors the old, and old age
seems the only disease; all others run into this one."' Physical and mental
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
Visiting Professor of Law, The Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is
submitted to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of The Journal of Contemporary Health
Law and Policy. The author is grateful for the research assistance of Joel Deuth.
1. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Circles in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON VOL. II ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES 177, 188 (Alfred R. Ferguson, et al., Harv. Univ.
Press 1979).
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disabilities accompany human years, often bringing with them a mental
capacity that is insufficient to safeguard of person and property, prompting
the creation of mechanisms to effectively transfer decision-making authority
to other persons or institutions.
Increasingly, attorneys are asked to provide legal services to clients under
circumstances that suggest that the client's mental capacity is diminished or
absent. Examples would include, most commonly, the preparation and
execution of a last will and testament. The formalities of due execution are
easily and objectively satisfied by the seasoned attorney. However,
particularly in regard to an aging population, the attorney must also confront
the more subjective intention of the client: Whether the client has the
necessary capacity for execution; whether the client is being unduly
influenced by another; or whether the client is executing the last will and
testament while under a delusion. Each of these subjective tests involving
client capacity has a corresponding legal pedigree delineating what must be
done to establish validity. Each requires the attorney to be sensitive to
personality issues involving the client and often the client's family and
beneficiaries.
In addition to last wills and testaments, larger numbers of clients are
requesting attorneys to prepare and execute durable powers of attorney,
which will transfer decision-making authority to another person in the event
that the principal becomes incapacitated in the future. Such an arrangement
is meant to avoid the appointment of a guardian or a conservator, which
would avoid court costs and presumptively, management by strangers to the
principal. All three arrangements-durable powers, guardianships and
conservatorships-"spring" into action because of the incapacity of the
principal. How does a court, usually upon petition of a family member,
prove incapacity of the principal? Does the client possess limited capacity?
And how does an attorney determine if the principal possessed capacity to
execute the durable power? If the durable power lacks effectiveness because
the principal was incapacitated at the time of execution then, upon petition, a
court may appoint a guardian or a conservator. But, as with the durable
power, what proof is necessary to establish the incapacity of the principal so
that the appointment is valid?
An attorney's relationship with his or her client is governed by rules of
professional responsibility. Each state licenses its attorneys to practice and
each state has its own rules of professional conduct. The American Bar
Association publishes Model Rules of Professional Responsibility and these
model rules illustrate the issues that arise in the context of an attorney and a
client's capacity. Overall, the rules govern when an attorney may withdraw
from providing services to a client, when an attorney for the client may
consult with persons or entities able to take necessary action, issues of
confidentiality, and making a good faith effort to apply the law to the needs
of the client.
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Admittedly, the attorney-client relationship does not occur in a vacuum
and the model rules seldom address the complex personal issues that arise.
Often the attorney performs services for the client within the context of a
blended family. That is, the attorney serves in a fiduciary capacity with
multiple members of one family, drafting and executing documents,
providing legal advice and representation in multiple settings, managing
assets or distributing support payments. In addition, an attorney receives
financial compensation for providing the client with services, compensation
that would be absent if the attorney withdrew from providing those legal
services. Many of the cases to be discussed in this Article occur in the
context of blended families or occur in tandem with the attorney who
provided services to the client and is also receiving substantial compensation
as a result of those services rendered. Likewise, many of the attorney-client
relationships described in this Article span the course of many years and not
just the time involved in the individual decision.
This Article suggests what an attorney should consider when representing
a client suspected by the attorney of having diminished capacity, anticipating
diminished capacity, or a client anticipating a response to the legal dilemmas
posed by aging. So too, this Article suggests what an attorney should
consider when retained by the family members of an allegedly incapacitate
person. After providing demographics regarding aging, this Article will
specifically address the attorney-client relationship in the context of the
Model Rules of the American Bar Association. Next, this Article will
integrate the attorney's responsibility regarding the proper execution of a
Last Will and Testament, including the issues of capacity and undue
influence. Then this Article will discuss the process of determining
incompetency of an adult is sufficient for appointment of a guardian or
conservator. This Article will provide illustrations from current cases,
applicable professional conduct parameters, and commentary from
practitioners offering guidelines for working with clients of diminished
capacity. Overall, this Article seeks to provide usable practice parameters
for attorneys working with an ever-increasing segment of the American
population, the elderly.
I. DEMOGRAPHICS
A. Case in Point
In 1914 a baby girl was born in rural Tennessee, as one of twelve
children; her parents named her Ellen.2 When she was twenty-two years old,
2. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
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she married and she and her husband remained in Tennessee throughout
their lives together. Her husband suffered a fall when he was in his late
seventies. While convalescing after the fall, he transferred a $100,000
certificate of deposit to his brother, Glendon, stipulating in an oral
agreement with the brother that the brother would take the money and care
for him and Ellen as long as they lived. The agreement was secret because
the husband wanted to qualify for Medicaid assistance and did not want the
money to be collateral for his health care expenses. Glendon performed as
expected and one year later the husband died. It was then that Glendon took
possession of his sister-in-law Ellen's remaining money and real estate,
moving Ellen into his home with him and his wife. While living in the
brother's home, Ellen executed a power of attorney 3 and a Last Will and
Testament,4 both in favor of her brother-in-law, Glendon, and prepared by
an attorney-friend of Glendon.
After one year of living in Glendon's home Ellen's friendship with her
brother-in-law and his wife ended amidst allegations that the brother-in-law
alienated Ellen from her family, that he stole from her, and that he unduly
influenced her. Then Ellen suffered a fall and Glendon moved her into a
nursing home where her niece Cheryl Travis visited her in person or by
phone. While in the nursing home, Ellen's relationship with Glendon
Groves and his wife continued to be estranged even further.5 Throughout
this time, Ellen's niece frequently came to visit her in the nursing home and
offered to take Ellen to live with her. The brother refused to move Ellen
from the nursing home, asserting that Ellen was incompetent. He then
6petitioned the court to be appointed as her conservator, in part to prevent
the niece from removing Ellen from the home. Glendon's petition occurred
when Ellen was eighty-four years old, was resentful for being in a nursing
home, and was angry with Glendon and his wife. Ellen's niece argued
against Glendon's appointment as conservator, asserting that Ellen was
sufficiently competent to make her own decisions, such as leaving the
nursing home and moving into the niece's home. A contest then ensued in
court to determine if there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence that
Ellen was sufficiently incompetent, so as to permit appointment of a
conservator.
3. For a discussion of the validity of the power of attorney and Ellen's ability to
revoke it, see infra at Part IV.B.
4. For a discussion of undue influence and impact on a Last Will and Testament,
see infra at Part III.B.
5. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 324-25.
6. Id. at 325.
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In response to Glendon's petition to be appointed as Ellen's conservator,
the trial court was required to determine if Ellen possessed the capacity to
manage her own personal and financial affairs. A local attorney was
appointed as the guardian ad litem for Ellen and after a trial by judge, the
court concluded that, among other things, Ellen possessed sufficient capacity
because, "(1) she 'retains the ability of long term memory,' (2) she is 'able
to express her will and make decisions,' and (3) she is 'capable of . . .
making decisions as to where she wants to live.' 7 Glendon appealed the
trial court's ruling leaving the appeals court to make a determination of
Ellen's competency.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee responded to Glendon's appeal with
an insightful analysis of the demographics of growing older in twenty-first
century America. The court began its opinion with an acknowledgement
that personal autonomy is "one of the bedrock principles of a free society."
This personal autonomy is challenged, partially or totally, whenever a
person: "[L]acks the ability to absorb information, to understand its
implications, to correctly perceive the environment, or to understand the
relationship between his or her desires and actions. A person is likewise
incapacitated when he or she cannot control his or her actions or behavior."9
This generic definition of capacity is complemented with the admonition
that adult persons are presumed to be sane and capable and the force of this
presumption "does not wane as a person ages."' 0 Furthermore, the burden to
rebut the presumption of capacity rests upon any challenger to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the person over whom the
conservatorship is sought is a disabled person according to the state's
statutory definition." Difficulties occur because Tennessee's conservator
statutes do not define incapacity and do not identify any particular illness or
7. Id. at 327. The client's ability to make decisions is the focus of inquiry. Capacity
to make a decision involves (1) the ability to make a choice, (2) understand information
presented that pertains to the decisions to be made, (3) appreciate the significance of this
information with regard to one's current circumstances, and (4) rationally use that
information to arrive at a decision. Barry Edelstein, Challenges in the Assessment of
Decision-Making Capacity, 14 J. AGING STUD. 423, 425 (2000).
8. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 327.
9. Id. at 329 (citing Lawrence A. Frolik, Statutory Definitions of Incapacity: The
Need for a Medical Basis, in OLDER ADULTS' DECISION-MAKING AND THE LAW 40
(Michael Smyer et al. eds., 1996)).
10. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 330. Capacity is not all or nothing; a
person may have capacity to perform a particular task, but not another. Capacity is also
situational and contextual. And capacity is not static but can fluctuate from moment to
moment. See id. at 333-34.
11. Id. at 330.
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conditions deemed to be disabling or incapacitating. 12 The lack of
specificity prompts the court to warn that participants in conservatorship
proceedings involving elderly persons should avoid the subtle influences of
ageism and the double standards that accompany it. "The aging process, by
itself, is not a disabling condition, and being elderly is not tantamount to
being disabled. The popular notion that the aging process entails
progressing decline in capacity or competence vastly oversimplifies a
complex process that affects an extraordinarily large and diverse group of
persons."13
When seeking to dispel the myth that the aging process is always
accompanied by poor physical and mental health, the court reports that:
[Seventy-five percent] of persons between 65 and 74 years of age
and 65% of persons 75 years of age and over report that they are in
good health. Ninety-five percent of persons over 65 years of age
and 80% of persons over 80 years of age are not affected by
significant cognitive impairment. . . . Thus, a vast majority of the
elderly are not experiencing a progressing physical or mental
decline. 14
Nonetheless, as the court then acknowledges, persons over the age of 65
experience the greatest incidence of chronic conditions.
More than one-half (54.5%) of persons 65 years of age and older
report having at least one disability, and more than one-third
(37.7%) report having at least one severe disability. In contrast,
approximately three out of every four (73.6%) persons 80 years of
age and over report at least one disability, and more than one-half
(57.6%) report one or more severe disabilities.' 5
Among the chronic conditions affecting elderly persons is dementia.
Surveys have established that approximately 10% of persons 65
years old or over have mild dementia and that 5% are severely
demented. In comparison, nearly one-half of persons 85 years old
or over have some form of dementia, and in 15 to 25% of these
persons, the dementia is severe.
12. Id. at 331. For a decision utilizing state statutory areas establishing competency
see In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Sim, 403 N.W.2d 721, 731 (Neb. 1987).
13. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W. 3d at 331-32.
14. Id. at 332 (citing FRANK B. HOBBS & BONNIE L. DAMON, U.S. DEP'T. OF
COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES
(1996), http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23-190.pdf).
15. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 332.
16. Id. at 336-37. But see Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Lawyering: Representing
Seniors in Light of Cognitive Changes Accompanying Aging, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1081,
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The classification of dementia can depend on its cause.
Alzheimer's disease is the single most common cause of dementia,
accounting for between 60 and 70% of the cases. Current
estimates are that 10% of persons 65 years-old and older and over
one-half of persons over 85 years old have Alzheimer's disease or
some other form of dementia and that the prevalence of the disease
doubles every five years beyond the age of 65.1
Many persons with Alzheimer's disease manifest non-cognitive
symptoms.18
In addressing the petition for appointment of a conservator for Ellen, the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee examined the testimony of six clinicians,
Ellen's personal physician, and various laypersons.19 "Considered together,
1098 (2013) (reporting that a small but recent study of healthy persons age 50 to 79 found
no significant differences in the logical consistency of older and younger individuals).
Other scholars reach similar conclusions, suggesting that seniors are adaptive in choosing
decision-making strategies and, therefore, remain able to make appropriate decisions. See
Darrell A. Worthy et al., With Age Comes Wisdom: Decision-Making in Younger and
Older Adults, 22 PSYCHOL. SCi. 1375, 1379 (2011).
17. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W. 3d at 338. ("The course of the illness can
be broken into stages. During the first stage, memory impairment is the most prominent
symptom. During the second state, the symptoms that may emerge include impairments
in language, performing everyday learned activities, recognizing the familiar, and
perceiving the world as it is. In addition, impairments in executive functions with regard
to personal hygiene, dressing, social etiquette, and self-control in the presence of strong
feelings such as anger, frustration, or fear become prominent. During the third stage, the
physical impairments associated with Alzheimer's disease become apparent. Many
persons become incontinent or mute and lose the ability to walk unaided."). Id. at 339.
18. Id.at339.
19. For a discussion of examining medical witnesses called to testify as to capacity
see generally E. David Griffith, Interrogating Medical Witnesses as to Mental Capacity,
23 COLO. LAW. 2753 (1994); Adam F. Streisand & James Edward Spar, A Lawyer's
Guide to Diminished Capacity and Effective Use of Medical Experts in Contemporaneous
and Retrospective Evaluations, 33 ACTEC J. 180 (2007). State statutes may require that
the evidence of a person's incapacity include the oral testimony or sworn written
statement of one or more qualified professionals. See, e.g., In re Bailey, 771 S.W.2d 779,
780 (Ark. 1989). Some courts are skeptical of medical testimony. See, e.g., Berry v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 53 A. 720, 725 (Md. 1902) ("The tendency of the medical
expert to involve in mystery the simplest unscientific facts, and to cloud them in
bewildering technical nomenclature, and then to deduce the most irrelevant conclusions
from them, is notorious, and is frequently exhibited in trials at nisi prius; and it is
consequently apparent that these medical experts are no better qualified to draw correct
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these clinicians' reports paint a picture of an elderly woman whose
functional capacity is significantly compromised and whose decision-
making capacity is significantly impaired and progressively deteriorating." 20
Using this testimony the court was then tasked with applying the law of the
state in the context of the demographics recited. The court ruled that there
was sufficient clear and convincing evidence of Ellen's functionality and
decision-making capacities to conclude that she was significantly impaired
21and probably has been since she first fell at age eighty-three.
Having concluded that a conservator should be appointed for Ellen, the
court remanded the case for a determination of who should be appointed
22conservator of Ellen. Then the court addressed the validity of the
intervivos transfer of the land owned by Ellen and her now deceased
23husband to Glendon, assessing whether there was undue influence exerted
by Glendon over Ellen's husband when the husband gifted the certificate of
deposit to Glendon, and whether Ellen's transfer of her personal property to
24Glendon during her lifetime was free from undue influence. No mention
was made as to the validity of the Last Will and Testament executed by
Ellen during her lifetime naming Glendon as beneficiary.25 Because the
court has adjudicated Ellen as incompetent, she may not be able to revoke it
26due to lack of testamentary capacity. But this is far from certain, and no
Last Will and Testament is operative until the death of the testator. In
addition, Ellen may have limited capacity sufficient for revocation of the old
will.27
B. Parallel Data
The demographics recited by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee's 2003
decision are confirmed in more recent statistics. Medical advances continue
inferences from everyday transactions and nonscientific premises that is the ordinary man
of average common sense.").
20. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W. 3d at 340.
21. Id. at 343. The court's decision complied with Tennessee statute, which requires
the court to find that there is clear and convincing evidence that the subject person is a
disabled person who is in need of a conservator's supervision, protection, and assistance.
Id.
22. Id. at 343-44.
23. Id. at 324.
24. Id. at 344-55.
25. Id. at 324 (discussing the execution of the will).
26. For a discussion of capacity in the context of a Last Will and Testament see infra
at Part III. A.
27. For a discussion of limited capacity see infra Part IV. C.
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to provide Americans with the ability to live longer.28 By 2030, it is
estimated that almost one-fifth of the American population will be age 65 or
29older. Indeed, the number of persons over the age of 90 tripled in the last
30 years and will quadruple in the next 40 years.30 Other sources provide
similar statistics:
Forty million Americans (13 percent of the population) are over
the age of 65; by 2050, this number is projected to more than
double to 88.5 million (20 percent). In addition, 5.7 million
Americans (1.8 percent) are over the age of 85; by 2050, this
number is projected to more than triple to 19 million (4.4 percent).
Fifty percent of individuals over 85 will need assistance with daily
functioning, and their home care can cost from $55,000 to $75,000
31a year and up to $180,000 annually for nursing home care.
32
Among those aging are many persons with Alzheimer's disease. In
2011, more than five million Americans were estimated to have Alzheimer's
33disease. The Alzheimer's Association estimates that 17% of all women
reaching age 65-and 9% of all men-will succumb to Alzheimer's at some
point during their lifetimes. 34 They also found that people age 65 and older
with Alzheimer's survive an average of four to eight years after a diagnosis
of the disease, but some will live as long as twenty years after diagnosis.35
As persons age they will require an increasing amount of care. Payment
will come from personal resources, health and long term care insurance, and
increasingly, Medicare and Medicaid. The Genworth 2013 Cost of Care
28. Michael Kruger, Statute Note: Only Terri Knows for Sure: A Comparison of
Utah and Florida Advance Medical Directive Statutes, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 465 (2006).
"One of the greatest advancements in the twentieth century was the exponential growth in
medical knowledge and its accompanying technology, including life-saving and life-
sustaining medical procedures."
29. See ADMIN. ON AGING, www.aoa.gov/aoaroot/agingstatistics/index.aspx (last
visited Nov. 25, 2013).
30. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS BUREAU
RELEASES COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF FAST-GROWING 90-AND-OLDER POPULATION,
Nov. 17, 2011,
http://www.census.gov/newsrooni/releases/archives/agingpopulation/cb11-194.html.
31. Russell N. Adler, Peter J. Stauss & Regina Kiperman, America's Long-Term
Care Crisis, 152 TRUSTS & ESTATES 44 (July 2013).
32. See generally 2011 ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE FACTS AND
FIGURES (2011), www.alz.org/downloads/Facts Figures_2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 25,
2013).
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id. at 14.
35. See id. at 23.
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Survey reports that 70% of individuals over the age of 65 will need some
form of long term care during their lifetimes. 36 Since 2004, long term health
care costs have risen at the rate of 4.7 to 47%, depending on the type of
care. 37 "Nationwide, the average annual cost of a nursing home is
approximately $90,000. In some major metropolitan areas, the cost can
exceed $200,000 a year." 38 The growing number of elderly persons prompts
some sociologists to suggest the development of a "sandwich generation" of
persons who will simultaneously care for their own minor children and their
aging parents.39
A 1998 U.S. Department of Labor opinion poll found that 44% of
Americans believe it likely that within the next ten years they would be
responsible for the care of an elderly parent or relative. Other surveys have
found that 22.4 million U.S. households are currently providing informal
care to a relative or friend age fifty or older or have done so in the past
twelve months.40
II. ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY
When the Court of Appeals of Tennessee ruled on the petition to establish
a conservatorship for Ellen,4 the court's decision encompassed an array of
attorney-client involvement. Groveton's personal attorney had prepared a
Last Will and Testament for Ellen to sign;42 this same attorney prepared two
quitclaim deeds conveying three tracts of real property to Glendon and his
wife and Ellen had signed these;43 and when Glendon petitioned the court to
44be appointed Ellen's conservator, an attorney was appointed to serve as
36. Compare Cost of Care Across the United States, GENTWORTH (2013),
https://www.genworth.com/corporate/about-genworth/industry-expertise/cost-of-
care.html. "Fifty percent of individuals over 85 will need assistance with daily
functioning, and their home care can cost from $55,000 to $75,000 a year and up to
$180,000 annually for nursing home care." Adler, supra note 31.
37. See 2010 Prudential Long Term Cost Study, PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC., (2010),
www.prudential.com/media/managed/LTCCost Study.pdf.
38. Bernard A. Krooks & Michael Gilfix, The High Cost ofAging, 151 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 43 (Jan. 2012).
39. See Paula L. Clark, "What Shall We Do With Dad?" Guardianship Reform in
Idaho and Its implications for the Elderly, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 269, 273 (2000).
40. Id.
41. See In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
42. Id. at 324.
43. Id.
44. The Uniform Probate Code distinguishes between a conservator and a guardian,
but often states apply either term to similar responsibilities. For sake of clarity, the
Vol. XXX:1I
Attorney Responsibility and Client Incapacity
Ellen's guardian ad litem.45 Increasingly, attorneys are involved in elder
law. "Clients consulting with elder and estate planning attorneys for estate
planning documents will likely receive a 'package' of five documents: a
will, a trust (revocable or irrevocable), a health care power, a durable power
of attorney, and a living will."4 Obviously, the attorney must make a
determination of whether the client possesses sufficient legal capacity to
perform the specific legal transaction required, such as making a will,
buying real estate, executing a trust, or making a gift.47
The American Bar Association recommends that attorneys proceed
cautiously when working with a client of suspected diminished capacity. 8
Section 1.14(b) of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Seventh Edition, stipulates that:
When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has
diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or
other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the
client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, include consulting with individuals or entities
Uniform Probate Code defines a guardian as someone responsible for an incapacitated
person pursuant to appointment by a parent, spouse, or by the court. The term includes a
limited, emergency, and temporary substitute guardian but not a guardian ad litem. See
UPC § 5-102(3). Likewise, a conservator means a person who is appointed by a court to
manage the estate of a protected person, to include a limited conservator. See UPC § 5-
102(1). The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act (1997/1998), which
has been substantially adopted into the Uniform Probate Code, provides similar
definitions. Likewise, the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings
Jurisdiction Act (2007) provides corresponding definitions.
45. Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W. 3d at 325. The guardian ad litem offered
little assistance to Ellen at the trial court hearing, declining to make a recommendation as
to a choice for a conservatorship. Id. at 326.
46. Robert Whitman, Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning, 117 PENN ST. L.
REv. 1061 (2013).
47. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Fowler, 371 N.E.2d 1345 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that gift by donor was void because the donor was suffering from delusion and
the intervivos gift was motivated by this delusion).
48. See A.B.A. & AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS WITH
DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS (2005),
http://www.apa.org/pi/aging/resources/guides/diminished-capacity.pdf. The attorney may
develop concerns about the client's capacity when communicating with the client. The
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Seventh Edition, Section 1.4(b) specifies that
"a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation." Such conversations may prompt
concerns.
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that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in
appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
conservator or guardian.
Commentary states that reasonably protective action could include:
[C]onsulting with family members, using a reconsideration period
to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using
voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers
of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional
services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities
that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective
action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes
and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best
interests and the goals of intruding into the client's
decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing
client capacities and respecting the client's family and social
-49connections.
These considerations complement more general efforts to protect older
persons from abusive exploitation, 50 but they remain vague, especially in the
context of confidentiality and the lack of objective standards.
A South Dakota Supreme Court decision is illustrative of what an attorney
should avoid when providing protective action for a client reasonably
believed to be incapacitated.5 ' Despite her misgivings about the client's
mental capacity, a South Dakota attorney drafted trust documents for a client
and the client signed them. Thereafter, legal disagreements arose between
the client and the attorney and the client refused to sign some documents
presented to him by the attorney. As a result, the attorney filed a petition
under Section 1.14(b) of the Model Rules requesting that the attorney be
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) cmt. (2011); see Cruver v.
Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269, 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that it was in the best interest
of the ward to appoint the county conservator rather than her children to care for her
property).
50. See, e.g., NAT'L COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF ELDER ABUSE,
http://www.preventelderabuse.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2013); see also A.B.A.
COMMISSION ON LAW & AGING, http://www.abanet.org/aging (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
For an illustration of the abusive conduct committed by a conservator appointed to care
for his mother see MERYL GORDON, MRS. ASTOR REGRETS: THE HIDDEN BETRAYALS OF A
FAMILY BEYOND REPROACH (2008) (detailing the abuse of Brook Astor, the 105 years-old
society heiress and socialite). Subsequently her son was convicted of theft and abusive
conduct. John Eligon, Mrs. Astor's Son Guilty of Taking Tens of Millions, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2009, at Al.
51. In re Discipline of Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41 (S.D. 2003).
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appointed the client's guardian, alleging that the client was incompetent.
The attorney sought appointment for a limited time during which the legal
matters would be settled and the client's business operations streamlined. In
addition, the attorney requested attorney fees in conjunction with these
services, although the attorney had already accepted a $3,100 retainer from
the client.52
Because Rule 1.14(b) says that a lawyer "may" seek appointment of a
guardian under certain circumstances, the attorney argued that in seeking to
be appointed as guardian for a client she suspected to be incompetent, she
was following the option provided by Rule 1.14(b). The attorney argued
that the Model Rule makes her decision regarding guardianship discretionary
based on emergency circumstances as she determined and not subject to
discipline. But the state supreme court disagreed, holding that seeking the
appointment of a guardian for a client must be distinguished from seeking to
be the guardian, and the court cautioned that a lawyer who files a
guardianship petition under Rule 1.14(b) should not act as or seek to have
himself or herself appointed guardian except in the most exigent of
circumstances, that is, where immediate and irreparable harm will result
from the slightest delay.53 The court ruled that:
In this matter [the attorney] drafted documents for and had them
signed by a client that she considered incompetent. She took
positions adverse to her client's interests and contrary to his
wishes. When he objected, she alleged that he was incompetent
and filed a petition requesting that she be appointed his guardian.
She believed that Rule 1.14 (Client under a Disability) mandated
her to seek her own appointment, something the rule clearly does
not require. Her client, who had not given his consent to her filing
the petition, discharged her. When his court appointed attorney
filed a motion to dismiss [the attorney's] petition, she resisted.
[The attorney's] actions, at a minimum, violated Rules 1.2 (Scope
52. Id. at 50.
53. Id. at 58. Courts may appoint any competent person as guardian of an
incapacitated person and the selection is of the person best able to meet the best interests
of the incapacitated person, regarding the ward's health care, comfort and maintenance.
See, e.g., Cruver v. Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (appointing a county
conservator rather than children of ward as conservator); In re Estate of Bragdon, 875
A.2d 697 (Me. 2005) (reciting rules regarding selection of conservator and holding that in
making a choice as to guardianship the court is to select the one best qualified among
those willing to serve).
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of Representation), 1.7 and 1.8 (Conflict of Interest), and 1.14
(Client Under a Disability).
Petitioning for the appointment of a guardian under Model Rule 1.14(b) is
rare and extreme. More common are those cases when the attorney is
confronted by a client that the attorney suspects is demonstrating diminished
capacity or, in the context of undue influence, is functioning under the
control of another person. Thus, the attorney must distinguish between a
lack of capacity for execution of legal documents and when a client is being
unduly influenced by a third party. In this regard the Model Rules offer little
guidance on how to proceed and the attorney must look to judicial decisions
and practice guidelines to function within ethical and legal parameters.
When assessing the client's legal capacity, the attorney may begin with
the presumption that the client is presumed competent. 5  The Court of
Appeals of Tennessee made this point in the case involving the petition for a
conservatorship of Ellen. "Because of the importance of autonomy, it is
well-settled that the law presumes that adult persons are sane, rather than
insane, and capable, rather than incapable, to direct their personal affair until
satisfactory evidence to the contrary is presented. Mental or physical
impairment should never be presumed."5 6 Furthermore, the "force of these
presumptions does not wane as a person ages." A practicing attorney
needs also to be aware that there are separate tests for capacity in the
execution of a Last Will and Testament, making an intervivos gift, execution
of a trust, a durable power of attorney, a health care directive, or to revoke
any of these mentioned. 8 If the attorney concludes that there is a substantial
54. Id.at6l.
55. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Brown, 44 S.E.2d 16 (Va. 1947) (holding that mental
capacity must be judged at the time the action is taken and holding in this case that
mental capacity was sufficiently present to execute a valid Last Will and Testament); see
also In re Estate of Raney, 799 P.2d 986 (Kan. 1990) (holding that specific circumstances
may take away capacity). Three states make the presumption of capacity irrebutable
through statute permitting pre-mortem probate. The three states are Arkansas, North
Dakota, and Ohio. See Lisa M. Stern, An Ounce ofPrevention, 147 TRUSTS & ESTATES
41, 42 (Aug. 2008).
56. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 329-330 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003). And this presumption of capacity must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Reyes, 731 P.2d 130 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that the significant loss of liberty accompanying appointment of a
conservatorship requires clear and convincing evidence of incapacity of principal).
57. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 330.
58. See Whitman, supra note 46, at 1074 (listing the criteria for legal capacity in six
different legal transactions); William R. Fatout, Capacity of Incapacitated Persons:
Marriage, Wills, Contracts, Deeds and Trusts, 48 J. OF IND. ST. B. Ass'N, RES GESTAE 25
Vol. XXX:1I
Attorney Responsibility and Client Incapacity
likelihood that the client is, or has become, incapacitated, then the attorney is
confronted with the professional dilemma of how to proceed and the
attorney faces difficult options when deciding how to proceed. Two
practicing attorneys advised that "the lawyer should always act on the side
of caution, with the informed consent model of advocacy guiding the lawyer
with difficult decisions . . . the language of the [Model Rules] does not give
the lawyer an open-ended license to substitute her judgment for the client's.
Rather, the lawyer should act only when absolutely necessary to do so."59
The first option available to an attorney is to establish an objective basis
of the incapacity; the American Bar Association Model Rules only refer to
incapacity as a result of "minority, mental impairment or for some other
reason."60 And the American Bar Association offers only general advice to
attorneys working with clients in their publication Assessment of Older
Adults with Diminished Capacity: A Handbook for Lawyers. 61 The
Handbook suggests that attorneys use "markers" to establish an objective
guideline to indicate emotional, cognitive, and behavioral signs suggesting
62diminished incapacity. Such an approach seems similar to suggested
timelines for management of an estate,63 or to Comment 6 to Section 1.14 of
the Model Rules. Comment 6 instructs an attorney to consider and balance
the following when determining the extent of a client's diminished capacity:
(1) the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision; (2)
variability of state of mind and the ability to appreciate consequences of a
(2004) (discussing statutes and cases involving legal incapacity); Adam F. Streisand &
James Edward Spar, A Lawyer 's Guide to Diminished Capacity and Effective Use of
Medical Experts in Contemporaneous and Retrospective Evaluations, 33 ACTEC J. 180
(1997) (listing the legal criteria for several different types of decisional capacity);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (providing
state criteria for capacity for wills and intervivos instruments); for a suggested uniform
test of capacity among all types of transactions see Whitman, supra note 46, at 1076-77.
59. Daniel L. Bray & Michael D. Ensley, Dealing with the Mentally Incapacitated
Client: The Ethical Issues Facing the Attorney, 33 FAM. L. Q. 329, 348 (1999). The
authors suggest that the attorney has several options, including: (1) talking to a client's
family member or physician; (2) initiating a guardianship proceeding; (3) taking other
protective action such as an emergency guardianship; and (4) withdrawal.
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2011); see also David A. Green,
"I'm OK You're OK": Educating Lawyers to "Maintain a Normal Client-Lawyer
Relationship" with a Client with a Mental Disability, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 65 (2003-04)
(recommending that there be more guidance for attorneys).
61. A.B.A. & AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N, supra note 48.
62. Id. at 13.
63. See G. Scott Budge, Grief and Estate Settlement, 151 TRUSTS & ESTATES 18
(Aug. 2012).
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decision; (3) substantive fairness of a decision; and (4) consistency with the
client's known long-term commitment and values. 4 These recommendations
suggest keeping proper records and written descriptions of client behavior.
Overall, when working with the client the attorney should strive to make
the client comfortable in the legal setting. The client's ability to demonstrate
cognitive ability should be:
[F]ree of extraneous factors that could negatively affect cognitive
function . . . [including] (1) environmental circumstances, such as
poor lighting, distracting noises, and suboptimal acoustics; (2)
client factors, such as acute emotional stress, medication side
effects, and excessive sleepiness due to pre-evaluation insomnia;
and (3) examiner factors, including an examination technique that
provokes unnecessary anxiety or otherwise fails to evoke a
reasonably representative performance.
One practicing attorney suggests utilizing the five areas of cognitive
function used in the Mini-Mental State Examination. This approach
suggests demonstrating to witnesses at the time of execution of legal
documents that the client was aware of (1) orientation, (2) registration, (3)
attention and calculation, (4) recall and language. The process would
consist of asking the client certain questions as part of the procedure to
"demonstrate that the client has general knowledge of the nature and extent
of his assets by listing the general nature and extent of his assets and the
approximate value of his estate. The client should also tell the witnesses the
names of those family members who would be the natural objects of his
bounty."6 Likewise, another practicing attorney suggests seeking guidance
64. See Ivan Taback & Vanessa L. Maczko, A Touchy Dilemma, 151 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 18 (Feb. 2012).
65. Adam F. Streisand & James E. Spar, A Lawyer's Guide to Diminished Capacity
and Effective use of Medical Experts in Contemporaneous and Retrospective
Evaluations, 33 ACTEC J. 180, 182-183 (2007) (explaining the use of the test and how to
evaluate a client's performance).
66. See Lisa M. Stern, An Ounce ofPrevention, 147 TRUSTS & ESTATES 41, 42 (Aug.
2008) (the examination is often used by health care professionals to assess mental status).
67. Proper capacity at the time of execution is conclusive. One court defines the
issue: "The question in the case is not whether Bright's disease in its usual course may or
may not induce mental incapacity, but, if that were a fact to be conceded, whether in this
particular case at the time of making of the will that result had been reached so that the
patient was then mentally so incapacitated as to be unable to make a valid deed or
contract." Homer v. Buckingham, 64 A. 41, 43 (Md. 1906) (holding that testator
possessed capacity at time of execution).
68. Id. at 43.
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from a third-party diagnostician under appropriate circumstances. 69 The
diagnostician serves to assess capacity and should not be confused with the
attorney's option of initiating protective action if the attorney thinks that the
client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm.70
If an attorney questions a client publically so as to establish a baseline of
capacity or seeks to initiate protective action, the attorney jeopardizes
maintaining a normal attorney-client relationship mandated by Model Rule
§ 1.14(a). 71 And if the attorney consults with diagnosticians or family
members, that attorney risks violating Model Rule §1.6(a), which provides:
"A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is
,,72permitted by [confidentiality exceptions listed in (b)]. The attorney has
little recourse in Model Rule § 1.14(c), which impliedly authorizes attorneys
taking protective measures under Section 1.14(b) to reveal information about
the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's
69. See Ivan Taback & Vanessa L. Maczko, A Touchy Dilemma, 151 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 18, 20 (Feb. 2012) (suggesting that Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.14 of the
American Bar Association permits this).
70. Id. at 21 (suggesting that Model Rule 1.14(b) and subsequent Comment 5 permit
this intervention); but see In re Guardianship of Henderson, 838 A.2d 1277 (N.H. 2003)
(holding that it was inappropriate to appoint a guardian for a client at the suggestion of
the attorney).
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2001): When a client's capacity
to make adequately considered decision in connection with a representation is
diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason,
the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client.
72. See id. at R. 1.6(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; (2) to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used
or is using the lawyer's services; (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client' commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the
client has used the lawyer's services; (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's
compliance with these Rules; (5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the clients; or (6) to comply with other law or a court order.
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interests. Comments to Section 1.14(c) indicate minimal guidance for an
attorney seeking to establish an objective basis for a client's capacity
without concomitantly seeking to take protective measures.7 3  And the
attorney may not withdraw from representing the client, once representation
has commenced, unless the representation will result in a violation of the
Rules, or there is no material adverse effect on the interests of the client, the
representation has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client, or
other good cause for withdrawal exists.74
To protect the responsible attorney, beneficiaries of a client's estate plan,
and the attorney's client from the effects of any future decreasing capacity,
one practicing attorney recommends creating "senior trusts."75  Such trusts
are designed to provide protection against the possibility of a senior
becoming emotionally or psychologically vulnerable to the influence of a
76third party as a result of a disability. Such trusts would also insulate a
client's assets from the client's potential incompetency. Specifically, the
attorney would assist the competent client to execute a trust of named assets
that will become irrevocable and non-modifiable when the client either dies
or becomes disabled. Then, so as to avoid the imposition of a gift tax
whenever the trust became irrevocable, the attorney would provide for the
appointment of a special trustee to assume the role of a co-trustee whenever
an event occurred that made the trust irrevocable. This special trustee would
have to join with the client who created the trust in any decisions involving
78gifts to third persons.
73. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility Informal Op. 1530
(1989) (the attorney may consult with client's physician concerning client's medical
condition when client is unable to do so); Me. Ethics Op. 84 (1988) (attorney may inform
client's son of father's mental incapacity so long as the son has no adverse interest in
father's affairs); Neb. Ethics Op. 94 (1991) (attorney may disclose client's confidential
communications to the extent necessary to protect client's best interests).
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2001).
75. Ceclia R. Clark, A Senior Trust, 147 TRUSTS & ESTATES 29 (June 2008).
76. Id. at 30.
77. Id.
78. Id. "To be certain that a taxable gift will be avoided after Dec. 31, 2009, the
clients' trusts need to be structured as both (1) grantor trusts under subpart E; and (2)
incomplete gifts under the principles expressed in Treas. Regs. Section 25.2511-2(b)." Id.
at 31. The client is considered as retaining a power over the property held in trust because
the client must act in tandem with the special trustee and thus, "the grantor's limited
power of appointment, exercisable jointly with the special trustee, is considered to be
held by the grantor for gift tax purposes." Id. at 32.
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III. LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
A. Testamentary Capacity
There are two specific issues that often arise in the context of clients with
diminished capacity and testamentary dispositions: incapacity at the time of
the execution of the Last Will and Testament and undue influence. Unless a
state permits pre-mortem probate, thereby making all intentionalities
irrebutable, the client's attorney must be attentive to these two issues when
preparing the Will and then executing the document.79
Regarding incapacity, a person is presumed to be sane, and thus able to
perform actions that manage and control property and life decisions; the
judicial test for testamentary capacity is minimal.so Most courts recognize a
test for capacity existing at the time of the execution of a Last Will and
Testament based on the Restatement (Third) of Property.8' The test consists
of four factors. The testator must be able to understand in a general fashion:
(1) the nature and extent of his or her property; (2) the natural objects of his
or her bounty; (3) the nature of this transaction by which property is being
disposed; and (4) be able to relate the above three elements to one another
82and forming an orderly disposition of the property. This formulation is
based on an accumulation of opinions and experience from the days of the
Roman Empire in the earliest centuries of the common age when
testamentary wishes were entrusted to the Vestal Virgins, through the
79. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (2012): "Any person who executes a
will . .. imay institute a proceeding . . . for a judgement declaring the validity of the will
as to the signature on the will, the required number of witnesses to the signature and their
signatures, and the testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence of the
person executing the will."
80. See In re Wurm, 360 N.E.2d 12, 16-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (Staton, J.,
dissenting) (reciting a liberty interest of managing your own property and of caring for
yourself as an inalienable right under the state constitution and should only be lost of the
citizen cannot protect self or property).
81. See, e.g., In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511, 516 (Colo. App. 2004).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.1(b) (2003); see also In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004)
(incorporating the Restatement test by requiring the testator to: (1) Understand the nature
of his act; (2) know the extent of his property; (3) understand the proposed testamentary
disposition; (4) know the natural objects of his bounty; and (5) the will represents his
wishes).
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deliberations of the English common law beginning one-thousand years
later. 83
Even though today's courts may rely upon ancient formulations of legal
testamentary capacity, they nonetheless utilize contemporary mental health
terms. Current state statutes define capacity in the context of decisional
capacity, rather than functional capacity. For example, Wyoming defines an
incompetent person as an "individual who, for reasons other than being a
minor, is unable unassisted to properly manage and take care of himself or
his property as a result of medical conditions of advanced age, physical
disability, disease, the use of alcohol or controlled substances, mental
illness, mental deficiency or intellectual disability."8 4 The decisive element
in each of the state statutes involves management and care of self and
property; state statutes seem focused on person and property and at least one
state mandates a time element to establish incapacity. The effect is not to
83. See, e.g., EUNICE L. Ross & THOMAS J. REED, WLL CONTESTS § 2.4 (2d ed.
2013) (citing to Roman law precedent); for a discussion of the history of standards for
capacity see Whitman, supra note 46, at 1063-67.
84. WYO. STAT. § 3-1-101(a)(ix) (2011).
85. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN 54.950 (8)(2008) (lacking the ability to manage
property and business affairs); W. VA. CODE § 39B-1-102(5) (2012) (inability to manage
property or business affairs); UTAH CODE § 75-1-201 (lacking sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions); TEX. ESTATES CODE §
1002.017(2) (an adult substantially unable to care for personal physical affairs or manage
financial affairs); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5501 (unable to manage finances or to meet
essential requirements for physical health and safety); OKLA. STAT. § 1-111 (A)(12)(b)
(lacks capacity to communicate responsible decisions regarding health, safety, or
finances); OHIO REV. CODE § 5101.60(I) (any person unable to make reasonable decisions
concerning self or resources); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01 (lacks capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning residence, education, medical treatment,
legal affairs, vocation, finance); N. M. STAT. § 45-5-101(F)(1978) (demonstrates over
time partial or complete functional impairment over personal affairs or financial affairs or
both); N.J. STAT. § 3B:1-2 (2013) (lacks sufficient capacity to govern self and manage
affairs); N.H. REv. STAT. § 464-A:2 XI (2009) ("all evidence of inability must have
occurred within 6 months prior to the filing of the petition and at least one incidence of
such behavior must have occurred within 20 days of the filing of the petition for
guardianship. Isolated instances of simple negligence or improvidence, lack of resources
or any act, occurrence or statement of that act, occurrence or statement as the product of
an informed judgement shall not constitute evidence of inability to provide for personal
needs or to manage property."); NEV. REv. STATS. § 162A.070(1) (2009) (has an
impairment in the ability to receive and evaluate information or to make or communicate
decisions even with the use of technological assistance); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-14-
702(5) (2011) (inability to manage business or property because of an inability to receive
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consider the functional impairment, but rather the decisive impairment that
may or may not result from the functional disability.
When a Last Will and Testament is submitted for probate, the testator is
dead and unable to be evaluated at that time in person. But when the court
considers a petition for the appointment of a conservator or a guardian, the
client is living and an assessment may be made at the time of the hearing.
Thus, establishing capacity after the death of the client is a greater challenge
even when the law states that capacity is presumed. Witnesses present at the
time of execution are meant to provide some assessment of the client's
capacity at the time of execution. However, as demonstrated in an early
Maryland decision, witnesses and the circumstances they relate can prompt
86uncertainty.
In the decision of Berry v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. ofBaltimore, the Last
Will and Testament was prepared by an attorney who served as a vice
president of the Safe Deposit & Trust Company. The execution of the will
was directed by the attorney and the attorney was one of three witnesses
present at the execution.8 7 Execution took place on February 10, 1899 and
the testator died one month later at the age of 78.88 Collateral relatives with
standing contested the will, arguing that the decedent lacked the mental
capacity to execute a valid will. To support their allegation they offered, "a
number of independent and disconnected incidents in the life of the testator
that had occurred both before and after the execution of the will." 89 During
the course of the trial, the plaintiffs' attorney asked one of the witnesses
whether the testator's "manner impressed the witness as being silly," 90
seeking thereby to suggest that the testator lacked capacity. But the court
dismissed any conjecture on the part of the witness, stating, "it is very easy
to say of a dead man that at some period in his life he impressed a witness as
being silly; and if the validity of wills is made dependent on such
and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions even with the use of
technological assistance); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5101(1) (2012) (lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his
person).
86. Berry v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 53 A. 720 (Md. 1902).
87. Id. at 722.
88. Id. at 721.
89. Id. at 723. Plaintiffs provided information that the testator had been addicted to
excessive smoking thirty years prior to execution of the Last Will and Testament, and
that he had borrowed a large sum of money, and his walk was "less elastic, and
degenerated into a shuffling gait." Id. at 724.
90. Id. at 724.
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impressions, it would not be difficult to vacate any will. . . ."91 Furthermore,
the court refused to allow testimony from medical experts concerning
testator's "silliness" since "those inferences were founded on data which
furnished no legal basis for such inferences."92 The court then stated the
rule that "if the facts did not warrant the introduction of expert testimony
because of the reasons heretofore assigned, then the purpose for which such
testimony was offered could not make it admissible."9 3 While not true in
every case involving testamentary capacity, the court in this case was quite
adamant in restricting the testimony of witnesses to facts rather than
inferences. The court wrote: "The rules of evidence cannot be applied too
rigidly . . . and the legal standard of testamentary capacity must be kept
clearly and sharply distinct from the speculative vagaries of dogmatic
experts. The common sense of judges, and of jurors, too, if a case is
submitted to them, must interpose to arrest such groundless assaults on
wills." 94
When attorneys are suspicious that a client may not possess proper
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will, the attorney
must be mindful of the practical suggestions seeking to avoid later contest.95
When Ellen executed the Last Will and Testament that benefitted her
brother-in law a number of issues arose. The first concern is that the will
was prepared by an attorney friend of the beneficiary, assumedly at the
behest of the beneficiary. Second, that Ellen was isolated from friends and
family in the home of the beneficiary, and because of conduct of the
beneficiary. Third, that Ellen's functional condition had already deteriorated
to the point that she could not live on her own any more. And lastly, that
Ellen's will ignore her living relatives, natural object of her bounty. And
obviously Ellen was susceptible to the influence of her brother-in-law.
91. Id.
92. Berry v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 53 A. 720, 726 (Md. 1902).
93. Id. Other courts have been supportive of this conclusion. See, e.g. Homer v.
Buckingham, 64 A. 41, 43 (Md. 1906): "It must be shownby facts. If a person has always
shown through many years a high degree of mental soundness, in fact through his entire
life, a jury ought not to be permitted to pronounce him insane, merely because a medical
expert can be found who will testify that he is affected with a disease that may eventually
produce insanity, without other facts being shown that tend to prove that his speech or
conduct is such as reasonably warrant the conclusion."
94. Id. at 728.
95. See supra Part II.
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B. Undue Influence
The vagaries of age may prompt an adult's susceptibility to incapacity and
undue influence; similarly, functional incapacity may prompt decisional
incapacity. Statutes often refer to a testator's "weakness of mind" when
defining undue influence, 96 incorporating symptoms such as depression,
dementia, impaired judgment, loneliness and grief A Colorado decision
illustrates a pattern that appears in many cases involving undue influence. 97
In that case, it was alleged that the testator had:
[F]or some years indulged in the excessive use of drugs and
alcoholic liquors to the extent that his mind and body was
diseased, so that he had lapses of memory, fits of unconsciousness
and insane delusions, and for such reasons he was unable to
clearly discern and comprehend the objects of his bounty on the
date of the making of the will.98
Not all of the facts in other cases are so scintillating. Many testators
simply grow old, suffering from "hardening of the arteries of the brain,
arteriosclerotic heart, high blood pressure and faulty kidney elimination."99
Many testators simply become disappointed over the life choices of their
logical objects of bounty. 00 Or they become lonely because of the death of
those closest to them, becoming dependent on others for care and emotional
support. 101
Susceptibility of the testator begins the inquiry into undue influence.
Accompanying this is always suspicious circumstances. For example, the
testator's pattern of estate distribution is markedly divergent from the past,
often benefitting persons not mentioned in previous wills or codicils. This
was a pattern evidenced by Ellen Groves, the subject of the Tennessee
96. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575: "Undue influence consists: 1. In the use, by
one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real or apparent
authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair
advantage over him; 2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or
3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessities or
distress."
97. Davis v. Davis, 170 P. 208 (Colo. 1917).
98. Id. at 209.
99. Ofstad v. Sarconi, 252 P.2d 94, 95 (Colo. 1952).
100. See, e.g., Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890 (N.J.
1981) (grandmother reduces the bequest to two of her grandchildren from $4 million to
$20,000 because of life choices they made).
101. See, e.g., Celia R. Clark, A Senior Trust, 147 TRUSTS & ESTATES 29 (June 2008)
(describing a 73 year-old man who had suffered the loss of his wife and thereafter
befriended a neighbor, to whom he gave almost all of his assets).
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decision previously discussed.102 After becoming seriously ill and then
moving into the home of her brother-in-law and his wife, Ellen executed "a
new will that left the bulk of her estate" to them.103 Concomitantly, the
beneficiaries of her new will made Ellen's family and friends unwelcome in
their home and isolated Ellen from their care and support. o0 Ellen was
forced to rely more heavily on the people benefitting under her will and her
family believed she had been "brainwashed" by them. 105
The facts surrounding the execution of Ellen's Last Will and Testament
are not uncommon. In one Colorado decision, the state's highest court was
asked to decide if there was sufficient evidence of undue influence to permit
the case to go to the jury to establish validity of the provisions. 106 The facts
recounted in the decision illustrate how an attorney may participate in
conduct that contributes to an eventual contest of the will based on undue
influence. The testatrix had executed a will that bequeathed her property to
her grandchildren; three years later she became ill and "she was continually
in a state of mental confusion, disoriented, incoherent; was very deaf; could
not hear without the aid of a hearing device; but apparently could understand
lip reading." 0 7 These conditions made her susceptible to influence from
others. It was then that her son brought his personal attorney to see his
mother and he directed his attorney to prepare a will for his mother that
revised her estate plan, replacing her granddaughter with her four
children.1os The mother-testatrix executed the will while under an oxygen
tent and while she was under the management and influence of her son, one
of the beneficiaries of the new will. She died three months later and the will
was offered for probate.
The existence of this second will was not known to other members of the
family until the night of the testatrix's burial. When the will was presented
for probate by the testatrix's son, it was challenged by a daughter of the
testatrix as being the product of the son's undue influence over his mother.
The daughter brought the contest on behalf of her child, who was the sole
beneficiary under the previous will of the testatrix. The facts alleged by the
daughter are consistent with other undue influence decisions:
[T]he will was prepared by the proponent's attorney [the son]
according to instructions given to him by the proponent; that the
102. See supra Part I. A.
103. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Ofstad v. Sarconi, 252 P.2d 94 (Colo. 1952).
107. Id. at 96.
108. Id.
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attorney never conferred with the testatrix prior to the drawing of
the will; that there was a confidential relationship between testatrix
and proponent; that the weakened mental and physical condition of
the testatrix made her susceptible to the influence of proponent;
that proponent at the time of the execution of the will directed
testatrix to do whatever proponent's attorney told her to do; that
the will as prepared was directly opposite to decedent's previous
testamentary disposition in favor of her granddaughter; that the
proposed will disclosed that its terms were favorable to proponent,
as against the former will. 109
The court held that the facts in the case were sufficient for the issue of
undue influence to be submitted to the jury, the opinion admitting that, "the
very nature of undue influence is such that it is rarely susceptible of direct or
positive proof, and must therefore rest upon circumstantial evidence."" 0
But, the court continues,
[T]here are many circumstances from which [undue influence]
may be inferred, namely, confidential relationship; preparation of
the will under the direction of one enjoying the confidence of the
testatrix; where the proponent will enjoy benefits from the
proposed will; when, at the time of execution of the will, the
testatrix was fatally ill, mentally and physically; and then the fact
that the execution of the will was by the proponent kept secret
from other members of the family."'
The factual elements illustrated by the Colorado decision are most
important in advising attorneys. Each of these factual elements-changed
testamentary plan, susceptibility, benefitting from a confidential
relationship, secrecy, and withholding material facts from persons with
standing-offer instructive advice to attorneys working with clients with
diminished capacity. It is not sufficient to be aware of the legal issues
involved in undue influence; 112 the practicing attorney must avoid the
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 97; see also Davis v. Davis, 170 P. 208, 212 (Colo. 1917): "Evidence to
show undue influence must be largely in effect circumstantial. It is an intangible thing
which only in the rarest instances is susceptible of what may be termed direct or positive
proof. The difficulty is also enhanced by the fact universally recognized that he who
seeks to use undue influence does so in privacy." Id
112. For an excellent summary of the legal analysis involved in issues of undue
influence, see Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890 (N.J. 1981)
(permitting the issue of undue influence to be submitted to a jury and detailing the legal
parameters of what the jury must consider).
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circumstances that almost always precipitate contest of the Will. As one
court noted, "[t]he only positive and affirmative proof required is of facts
and circumstances from which the undue influence may be reasonably
inferred."113 It is the responsibility of the attorney to ensure that the facts
and circumstances precipitating allegations of undue influence do not
-114
arise.
IV. CONSERVATORS, GUARDIANS AND DURABLE POWERS OF ATTORNEY
A. Statutory Distinctions
The American Bar Association's Annotated Model Rules of Professional
Conduct permit an attorney, when he or she reasonably believes that the
client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical or financial
harm, and cannot protect his or her own interests to take reasonable
protective action, including seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
conservator, or guardian." 5 The fact that the Model Rules uses three terms,
guardian ad litem, conservator, and guardian, indicates that states may use
words interchangeably or there is inconsistent meaning among the states.
The Uniform Probate Code distinguishes between a conservator and a
guardian, but often states fail to follow the responsibilities to each in the
Uniform Probate Code.
In an effort to provide a standard for responsibilities, the Uniform Probate
Code defines a guardian as someone responsible for an incapacitated person
pursuant to appointment by a parent, spouse, or by the court." 7 The term
includes a limited, emergency, and temporary substitute guardian but not a
guardian ad litem." 8 At least as far as the Uniform Probate Code is
concerned, a guardian "shall make decisions regarding the ward's support,
care, education, health and welfare."ll9 It is not the responsibility of the
guardian to manage the assets of the ward, only to "expend money of the
113. Davis v. Davis, 170 P. 208, 213 (Colo. 1917); see also In re Guardianship of
Macak, 871 A.2d 767 (N.J. Super. 2005) (holding that a person of limited capacity may
be subject to undue influence).
114. But see DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE Epic BATTLE FOR THE
JOHNSON& JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993) (describing the failed efforts of Nina Zagat, an
attorney with the New York law firm of Shearman & Sterling, to avoid any will contest
over the estate of Seward Johnson).
115. A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2011).
116. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-102.
117. Id. at § 5-102(3).
118. See id.
119. Id. at § 5-314.
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ward that has been received by the guardian for the ward's current needs for
support, care, education, health, and welfare."120 The conservator provides
the asset management.
Under the terms of the Code a conservator means a person who is
appointed by a court to manage the estate of a protected person, to include a
limited conservator. 121 The Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act (1997/1998), which has been substantially adopted into the
Uniform Probate Code, provides similar definitions, as does the Uniform
Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (2007).
These uniform codes designate a conservator as the person responsible for
management of the property of the ward, not the person of the ward himself
or herself. Specifically the conservator must "determine how the estate of
the protected person which is subject to the laws of this state must be
managed, expended, or distributed to or for the use of the protected person,
individuals who are in fact dependent upon the protected person, or other
claimants."122 A court has the power, which may be exercised directly or
through a conservator "over the estate and business affairs of the protected
person which the person could exercise if the person were an adult, present,
and not under conservatorship or other protective order."23
120. Id. at § 5-314(b)(3).
121. See id. at § 5-102(1).
122. Id. at § 5-402(2). Specifically the conservator may do the following: (1) make
gifts, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-427(b); (2) convey, release, or disclaim
contingent and expectant interest in property, including marital property rights and any
right of survivorship incident to joint tenancy or tenancy by the entireties; (3) exercise or
release powers of appointment; (4) create revocable or irrevocable trust of property of the
estate, whether or not the trust extends beyond the duration of the conservatorship, or
revoke or amend a trust revocable by the protected person; (5) exercise rights to elect
options and change beneficiaries under insurance policies and annuities or surrender the
policies and annuities for their cash value; (6) exercise any rights to an elective share in
the estate of the protected person's deceased spouse and to renounce or disclaim any
interest by testate or intestate succession or by transfer inter vivos; and (7) make, amend,
or revoke the protected person's will. Id. at § 5-411(a); see also Id. at § 5-425(b), listing
twenty-five specific powers of a conservator in administration; see also In re Medworth,
562 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that a conservator has the least amount of
power to provide for the best interest of the principal).
123. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-410(2). Courts must be guided by what the protected
person would have done, considering: (1) the financial needs of the protected person and
the needs of individuals who are in fact dependent on the protected person for support
and the interest of creditors; (2) possible reduction of income, estate, inheritance, or other
tax liabilities; (3) eligibility for government assistance; (4) the protected person's
previous pattern of giving or level of support; (5) the existing estate plan; (6) the
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And there is another option available to transfer management
responsibilities over persons or property. Some adults, mindful of the need
to plan for later incapacity, execute durable powers of attorney, which
eliminate the need of court-appointed guardians and yet legally delegate
management responsibility to another person.124 The principal must be
competent to execute a valid power of attorney,125 but if valid the agent
appointed under a durable power may do the following: (1) create, amend,
revoke, or terminate an intervivos trust; (2) make a gift; (3) create or change
rights of survivorship; (4) create or change a beneficiary designation; (5)
delegate authority granted under the power of attorney; (6) waive the
principal's right to be a beneficiary ofa joint and survivor annuity, including
a survivor benefit under a retirement plan; (7) exercise fiduciary powers that
the principal has authority to delegate; or (8) disclaim property, including a
power of appointment.126 Of course because the principal is competent
when the power is executed, the principal may add or delete powers granted
to the attorney,127 but, unless otherwise stated in the instrument, state
statutes will define the scope of the powers.128
Powers under a durable power of attorney, guardianship or
conservatorship cease upon the death of the protected person.129 For
protected person's life expectancy and the probability that the conservatorship will
terminate before the protected person's death; and (7) any other factors the court
considers relevant. Id. at § 5-411(c).
124. See UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (2006) (adopted into the Uniform
Probate Code as Article 5B). The Act provides for the appointment of an agent to manage
some or all of the principal's property upon execution of the power of attorney or at some
future event or contingency, such as the principal's incapacity. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
5B-108(b).
125. See Thames v. Daniels, 544 S.E.2d 854 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the
principal possessed the proper capacity to execute a valid power of attorney); Rawlings v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (court applied
the Second Restatement test of whether the grantor knew what he or she was doing and
could act in a reasonable manner).
126. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5B-210(a).
127. See Ruth A. Phelps, Driving Aiss Daisy, 150 TRUSTS & ESTATES 18 (July 2011)
(suggesting specific powers to be included in a power of attorney).
128. See generally Smithy. Wells Fargo Bank, 991 A.2d 20 (D.C. 2010) (interpreting
limits placed on a valid power of attorney); Franzen v. Northwest Bank of Colorado, 955
P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (court interpreted new state statute limiting attorney's
power to revoke a trust).
129. See In re Guardianship of Hollenga, 852 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(applying state statute specifying when a power is cancelled).
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example, the Uniform Probate Code provides that upon death of the
principal:
[T]he conservator shall deliver to the court for safekeeping any
will of the protected person which may have come into the
conservator's possession, inform the personal representative or
beneficiary named in the will of the delivery, and retain the estate
for delivery to the personal representative of the decedent or to
another person entitled to it. 130
Therefore, upon the death of the principal, the court, a personal
representative or beneficiary begins the process of estate administration or
probate. 131
Attorneys are almost always involved in the drafting and execution of
these documents. In addition, they represent clients in petitions seeking to
establish a conservatorship or guardianship. They also represent clients in
contests to resist appointment. As we will explain, because the hearing to
discuss the sufficiency of the clear and convincing evidence for appointment
is civil in nature, persons alleged to be incapacitated are not entitled to an
attorney. Nonetheless, if the court appoints a guardian ad litem to represent
the person then representation by counsel will follow as part of the best
interest of that client. Attorneys must be attentive to functional versus
decisional incapacity, limited and unlimited guardianship, the selection of
persons tasked by the court to provide evidence, the selection of an
appropriate guardian or conservator, review and evaluation of the
conservator during the conservatorship, and the smooth transition from the
conservatorship to probate upon the death of the ward. Each of these
elements will be illustrated in the material that follows.
B. Evidentiary Basis for Appointment
Prior to a court appointing a guardian or a conservator, and prior to the
commencement of a durable power of attorney, there must be a
"management competency test."l32 This test involves a person's "ability to
manage, or improvident disposition, or dissipation of property, or
130. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-428(a).
131. For an explanation of estate administration and probate see UNIF. PROB. CODE
Art. II.
132. In re Conservatorship of Hester, 989 So.2d 986, 989 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)
(evidence supported statutory test for the appointment of a conservatorship); see also In
re Estate of Wood, 533 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that adult of limited
capacity was still competent when she could state where her money was located and
could choose a financial representative).
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susceptibility to influence or deception by others, or other similar factors."' 33
One state statute provides that: "Isolated instances of simple negligence or
improvidence, lack of resources, or any act, occurrence, or statement, if that
act, occurrence, or statement is the product of an informed judgment, shall
not constitute evidence of inability to provide for personal needs or to
manage property." 134 The test is to determine if someone should be
appointed to manage the person, his or her property, and to what extent, total
or limited. Such an appointment involves constitutional issues of liberty and
due process. Legislatures and courts must be sensitive to providing clear
and convincing evidence.
The facts in many of the cases prompting court intervention are eerily
similar: "Emma was a seventy-six-year-old woman . . . [and] there is
evidence that Emma was capable of performing basic tasks of self-
preservation, the evidence support the conclusion that Emma was incapable
of managing her own affairs by reason of advanced age and mental
weakness." 35 She had relied on her live-in son to manage her affairs, but
he:
[U]tilized her front yard as a used car lot for his business [Glen's
Auto Sales] . . . [her] home fell into a state of exceptional disrepair
... the area surrounding the house was littered with garbage and
cluttered with old items that most people would consider junk. 36
When her other son attempted to intervene in her affairs she told him that
"he was not welcome in her home" and this prompted him to file the
conservatorship petition concerning his mother. 137 The petition went to trial
and the court considered the testimony or the woman's primary physician,
who stated that, "she is somewhat uncertain at times of her business
affairs." 138 A guardian ad litem was appointed for the woman and he
reported to the court that she is not now nor has she probably ever been
capable of managing her own financial affairs. 139 At the conclusion of the
testimony the court appointed the son as the conservator of his mother and
the woman appealed this decision, in part because of the testimony of the
133. Conservatorship ofHester, 989 So.2d at 989 (citing to Miss. CODE § 93-13-251
(2004)).
134. IDAHO CODE § 15-5-101(a)(3), cited in Paul L. Clark, "What Will We Do With
Dad?" Guardianship Reform in Idaho and Its Implications for the Elderly, 36 IDAHO L.
REv. 269, 280 (2000).
135. Conservatorship ofHester, 989 So.2d at 989-90.
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physicians. But the appellate court affirmed. When it did so the court relied
upon the state's conservatorship statute. There was a requirement in the
statute that two physicians make a written certificate regarding the condition
of the ward and file this with the clerk of the court,140 but the physicians'
certificates are not conclusive of incapacity. "The point to be stressed is that
it is the chancellor who determines whether the ward is rendered incapable
of managing his or her own estate due to advanced age, physical incapacity,
or mental weakness."' 4 ' The medical reports submitted were part of overall
sufficient evidence to support the chancellor's appointment of a
conservatorship. The decision illustrates the necessity of clear and
convincing evidence and that the evidence must be taken as a whole, there is
no single objective test establishing sufficient diminished capacity and
subsequent appointment of a conservator or guardian.
State statutes often mandate a professional evaluation.142 For example,
under Article V, part 3, of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act, prior to judicial appointment of a guardian:
[T]he court may order a professional evaluation of the respondent
and shall order the evaluation if the respondent so demands. 143 f
the court orders the evaluation, the respondent must be examined
by a physician, psychologist, or other individual appointed by the
court who is qualified to evaluate the respondent's alleged
impainnent. The examiner shall promptly file a written report with
the court. 44
Evaluations are part of the clear and convincing evidence necessary prior
to appointment of the guardian and, although they pose a significant
intrusion into a person's personal privacy and liberty, courts have permitted
them in civil proceedings. The Fourth Amendment would bar similar
requirements in the case of criminal allegations not supported by probable
cause.
Before a conservator may be appointed, the court must determine that
there is sufficient clear and convincing evidence that a person "lacks ability
140. In re Conservatorship of Hester, 989 So.2d 986, 990 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008),
citing Miss. CODE § 93-13-255.
141. Conservatorship ofHester, 989 So.2d at 990.
142. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 28-65-212.
143. See, e.g., In re Bailey, 771 S.W.2d 779 (Ark. 1989) (holding that state statute
defining evaluation means a professional assessment of the abilities of a person and the
impact of any impairments on the individual's capability to meet the essential
requirements for his health and safety or to manage his estate).
144. The Act has been substantially incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code and
the pertinent portion appears at UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-306.
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to manage his financial resources."' 4 5  Likewise, if a guardian is to be
appointed for a person, and this is separate from a person to manage the
property of a person, then there also must be clear and convincing evidence
of mental incompetence.' 4 6 Because a person's fundamental right to liberty
is threatened, clear and convincing evidence is required. Courts are sensitive
to establishing that each case must be decided upon its particular facts and
that a person may possess sane and normal action even though it is not the
caliber of what it once was. 147 All the decisions seek to balance
accommodating unique behavior against destructive behavior. One older
court decision described this balance:
Men of sound mind are frequently spendthrifts. Such have the full
right to use, enjoy, waste, and destroy their property, and it is
nobody's business or right to interfere. Some men waste their all
in gambling and dissipation, but cannot be pronounced insane in
145. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Leonard, 563 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1997)
(holding there was insufficient evidence to support the imposition of an involuntary
conservatorship); Strauss v. Strauss, 755 S.W.2d 742 (Mont. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
state statute and holding that man suffering from psychiatric disorder was clearly and
convincingly sufficiently disabled to support appointment of a conservator); In re
Guardianship of Reyes, 731 P.2d 130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding there must be clear
and convincing evidence that adult cannot make responsible decisions concerning his
personal safety or personal needs).
146. See, e.g., Cruver v. Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
the state conservator statute allows appointment of a conservator only if a court finds an
adult lacks sufficient capacity to make or communicate significant responsible decisions
concerning the management of his or her property); In re Blochowitz Guardianship, 280
N.W. 438 (Neb. 1938) (interpreting state statute and holding that a person is incompetent
whenever a person is incapable of understanding and acting with discretion in the
ordinary affairs of life); In re Wurm, 360 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that test of a person's incompetency should involve a person's total physiology, both
physical and mental); and some states provide specific areas to use in positing incapacity,
see, e.g., In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Sim, 403 N.W.2d 721 (Neb. 1987)
(referencing NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2619.01).
147. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Hyde, 176 N.W.2d 234 (Neb. 1970) (holding that
73 year-old man who had suffered a paralytic stroke was capable of sane and normal
action and that petitioners had not met the burden of proof for the appointment of a
guardian); see also Schaefer v. Schaefer, 52 P.3d 1125 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
there was insufficient clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of
competency); Nelson v. Stueve, 821 P.2d 439 (Or. App. 1991) (holding that being an
alcoholic is not sufficient clear and convincing evidence of incapacity); Lewis v. Lewis,
20 S.E.2d 107 (S.C. 1942) (holding that clear and unequivocal allegations are necessary
to establish incapacity).
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the proper sense of the word. That unsoundness of mind, that
lunacy which we are inquiring after in this issue, is such an
unsoundness of mind as is evidenced by a total absence of
sufficient capacity (mentally) to attend to the ordinary business of
life. When one is entirely incapable of caring for, controlling, and
managing his own person and property, he is in the eye of the law
a lunatic, requiring a guardian. 148
C. Limited Guardianships
Commentators on the effects of guardianship often lament the "civil
death" of a ward occasioned by the appointment of a guardian of the person
or of a conservator of the property. 149 One prolific commentator on
disability law laments that, "[a]t best, guardianship will provide personal
care and property management that an individual with a disability alone
cannot handle. At worst, it will deprive that individual of decision-making
authority that he or she does have the capacity to handle, and will, at the
same time, create the opportunity for personal or financial abuse." 5 0 To
address this all or nothing aspect of guardianship some commentators have
advocated for a form of limited guardianship, which permits offering an
individual limited assistance. This substitute for total control by a
guardian has been characterized as supported decision-making. 152
148. Robertson v. Lyon, 24 S.C. 266, 267 (S.C. 1886) (holding that there was
sufficient evidence to confirm finding of jury that person was incapacitated).
149. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the
Mind": The Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Mental Disabilities and the Future
of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN. STATE L. REv. 1159, 1166 (2013) (discussing the
impact of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).
150. Id. at 1171; for a discussion of the all or nothing approach to powers of a
guardian; see also Rose Mary Bailly & Charis B. Nick-Torok, Should We Be Talking?-
Beginning a Dialogue on Guardianship for the Developmentally Disabled in New York,
75 ALB. L. REv. 807 (2012); Debra H. Kroll, To Care of Not to Care: The Ultimate
Decision for Adult Caregivers in a Rapidly Aging Society, 21 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L.
REv. 403 (2012).
151. See, e.g., Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness A legal
and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 279 (2011); Jennifer
L. Wright, Guardianship for Your Own Good: Improving the Well-Being ofRespondents
and Wards in the USA, 33 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 350 (2010).
152. See Nina A. Kohmn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported
Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1112,
1120 (2013).
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"Supported decision-making occurs when an individual with cognitive
challenges is the ultimate decision-maker but is provided support from one
or more persons who explain issues to the individual and, where necessary,
interpret the individual's words and behavior to determine his or her
preferences."153
Increasingly state legislatures have accommodated the degrees of
incapacity an individual may experience, and "numerous recognize in their
guardianship statutes that mental capacity is not always an 'all or nothing
phenomenon.'" 5 4 For example, Idaho's code stipulates that a judge is to
encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence in
the incapacitated person and only issue orders necessitated by the
incapacitated person's actual mental and adaptive limitations. 5 5 Provisions
similar to those in Idaho may be found in additional states and uniform
legislation, such as the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings
Act (1997) and the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings
Jurisdiction Act (2007), the latter of which having been adopted into the
Uniform Probate Code as Article 5A. '5 6 The prior Act, the 1997 legislation,
which has been substantially adopted into the Uniform Probate Code, creates
a presumption in favor or limited guardianship. In specifying the elements
of the petition, the petitioner may apply for the appointment of a limited or
an unlimited guardian for an individual. " Then, in addition to specifying
why the guardianship is necessary, the Code provides that if "an unlimited
guardianship is requested, the [petitioner must state] the reason why limited
guardianship is inappropriate and, if limited guardianship is requested, the
powers to be granted to the limited guardian." 58
153. Id. at 1120. For a Canadian model of supported decision-making see
Representation Agreement, NIDUS, http://www.nidus.ca/?page id=50/ (last visited Dec.
23, 2013).
154. Debra H. Kroll, To Care or Not to Care: The Ultimate Decision for Adult
Caregivers in a Rapidly Aging Society, 21 TEMuP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 403, 435
(2012); see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5-105 (2011); N.M. STAT. § 45-5-304
(2009); and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-2 (2011).
155. See IDAHO CODE § 15-5-304(a).
156. The UGPPA is a comprehensive act addressing all aspects of guardianship and
protective proceedings for both minors and adults. The latter act, the UAGPPJA has a
much narrower scope, addressing only jurisdiction and related issues in adult
proceedings. UNIF. PROB. CODE, Art. 5A, at Pref. Note.
157. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-304(a).
158. Id. at § 5-304(b)(7)-(8); for a sample petition for limited guardianship see Meta
S. David, Note, Legal Guardianship of Individuals Incapacitated by Mental Illness:
Where Do We Draw the Line?, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 465, 487-96 (2012); see also In re
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D. Appointment of Counsel
At any hearing to appoint a guardian for individual, state statutes require
that the petitioner be present at the hearing; in addition, the proposed
guardian must be present if this is another individual.159 "The respondent
shall attend and participate in the hearing, unless excused by the court for
good cause shown.", 6 0 And any other person may request permission to
participate in the hearing upon approval of the court upon a showing that this
is in "the best interest of the respondent." 1 But there is no constitutional
requirement for an attorney to be present at the guardianship hearing.
Unlike criminal proceedings, a petition for guardianship is a civil proceeding
and thus devoid of the right-to-counsel argument discussed in criminal
decisions such as of Gideon v. Wainwright.162 Nonetheless, as has been
explained throughout this Article, establishing incapacity and the
appointment of a guardian or conservator result in diminishment of liberty
and property.163 And there are judicial opinions holding that due process
and equal protection require the appointment of an attorney each time a
petition is heard to appoint a guardian for an allegedly incapacitated
person. 1 Subsequent decisions continued to hold that even when
appointing a temporary guardian state law requires the appointment of an
attorney to represent the interests of the person alleged to be incompetent.
That is, any person alleged to be incapacitated is entitled to be represented
Guardianship of Macak, 871 A.2d 767 (N.J. Super. 2005) (holding that a person of
limited capacity may be subject to undue influence of others).
159. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-308(a).
160. Id.
161. Id. at § 5-308(b).
162. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a right to an
attorney in a criminal felony trial); but see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) (holding that there is no constitutional basis for confinement of mentally ill
persons involuntarily if they pose no danger and can live safely alone).
163. See generally Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again); Substituted
Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2012); In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528
N.W.2d 567, 582-83 (Iowa 1995) (holding that due process and equal protection require
increased procedural protections when processing petitions for guardianship); also
commentators have found support for greater protection in international law. See, e.g.,
Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind": The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of
Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159 (2013).
164. See, e.g., In re Fey, 624 So.2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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by counsel in proceedings to determine capacity and to determine whether a
guardian should be appointed over his person or property. 1 But
appointment will vary from state-to-state and the lack of a constitutional
mandate permits the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions and among
clients.
CONCLUSION
Current statistical models reveal that the number of persons approaching a
time when many will experience disabilities is rapidly rising. Some of these
persons will only experience functional disabilities, debilitating conditions
that are restricted to the functioning of physical activities. But an increasing
number of persons will confront decisional disabilities, a sudden or gradual
incapacity of the mind that impairs judgment and imperils person and
property. Increasingly, attorneys will become involved in legal transactions
encompassing marriage, intervivos gifts, creation of trusts, execution of trust
powers, execution of a Last Will and Testament, revocation and revival of
wills, and execution of powers of attorney and health care directives. And
these legal transactions are complicated by the existence of blended families,
where the attorney serves in a fiduciary capacity for many members of the
same family, each with separate expectations.
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
offer general guidance as to how an attorney should proceed when asked to
represent or working with a client in a representative capacity. The Model
Rules use cautionary language of when an attorney believes the client has a
mental impairment or diminished capacity. When the occasion arises the
Model Rules admonish the attorney to take reasonably necessary protective
action, but the attorney is limited in what may be revealed, what action may
be taken, and how to make a good faith effort. And admittedly, the
attorney's position is further complicated by the financial remuneration that
accompanies representing the client in any legal transaction.
This Article suggests that the attorney must be very attentive to
establishing an objective strategy in each attorney-client transaction. In
addition to the Model Rules, the Article offers instructive strategies for
dealing with clients, tests to be used, and how to create legal structures that
will protect a client's interests in the years to come. This Article also
describes the issues that will arise as clients become increasingly
incapacitated, whether they are willing to admit this or not. In recent
decades legislatures and courts have provided better guidance on what
165. See Martinez ex rel. Smith v. Cramer, No. 4D13-405, 2013 WL 4006526 (Fla.
Dist. Aug. 7, 2013) (applying FLA. STAT. § 744.331(2)(a) (2012)).
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constitutes sufficient clear and convincing evidence of sufficient decisional
incapacity to warrant the appointment of a guardian or a conservator. The
appointment, scope, and supervision of these appointments are discussed in
the Article in connection with the Uniform Probate Code and related
uniform acts.
Americans can be confident that medical technology will continue to
provide innovations that will permit those with sufficient means to prolong
their lives. With this longevity comes increasing incidence of mental
incapacity. And those who are likely to live the longest will require an
increasing level of legal assistance. Mindful of the needs of a client, the
demands of the profession, and the attorney's common sense, today's
attorneys must be attentive to the opportunities of tomorrow.
